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Common Sense

By Thomas Paine

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Chapter I

OF THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL,

WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION

SOME writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them. Whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness. The former promotes our happiness positively, by uniting our affections; the latter negatively, by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse; the other creates distinctions. The first a patron; the last a punisher.

Society in every state is a blessing, but government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil. In its worst state, an intolerable one. For when we suffer or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer. 

Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence. The palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver. 

But that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest. This he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least. 

Wherefore, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expense and greatest benefit, is preferable to all others.

In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest. They will then represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world. In this state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought. 

A thousand motives will excite them thereto. The strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the same. 

Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of a wilderness, but one man might labor out of the common period of life without accomplishing anything. When he had felled his timber, he could not remove it nor erect it after it was removed. 

Hunger in the meantime would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Disease, nay even misfortune, would be death. For though neither might be mortal, yet either would disable him from living and reduce him to a state in which he might rather be said to perish than to die.

Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived emigrants into society. The reciprocal blessings of which would supersede and render the obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other. 

But as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen that in proportion as they surmount the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other. And this remissness will point out the necessity of establishing some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue.

Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under the branches of which, the whole colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their first laws will have the title only of Regulations and be enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament, every man, by natural right, will have a seat.

But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increase likewise. And the distance at which the members may be separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occasion as at first: when their number was small, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. 

This will point out the convenience of their consenting to leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those who appointed them and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were they present. 

If the colony continues increasing, it will become necessary to augment the number of the representatives, and that the interest of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found best to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part sending its proper number. 

That the elected might never form to themselves an interest separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often. Because, as the elected might by that means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themselves. 

And as this frequent interchange will establish a common interest with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally support each other. On this, depends the strength of government, and the happiness of the governed.

Here then is the origin and rise of government —namely, a mode rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world. Here too is the design and end of government, viz. freedom and security. 

And, however our eyes may be dazzled with show or our ears deceived by sound and however prejudice may warp our wills or interest darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature and of reason will say — it is right.

I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered. The easier it is repaired when disordered. 

With this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks on the so much boasted constitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected — is granted. When the world was overrun with tyranny, the least remove therefrom was a glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions, and incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.

Absolute governments have this advantage with them, that they are simple. If the people suffer, they know the head from which their suffering springs and know likewise the remedy. They are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures. 

But the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex, that the nation may suffer for years together without being able to discover in which part the fault lies. Some will say in one and some in another. Every political physician will advise a different medicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices. 

Yet, if we will suffer ourselves to examine the component parts of the English constitution, we shall find them to be the base remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with some new republican materials.

First: The remains of monarchical tyranny in the person of the king.

Secondly: The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.

Thirdly: The new republican materials, in the persons of the commons, on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of the people. Wherefore, in a constitutional sense, they contribute nothing towards the freedom of the state.

To say that the constitution of England is a union of three powers reciprocally checking each other — is farcical. Either the words have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things:

First: That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after. Or, in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural disease of monarchy.

Secondly: That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or more worthy of confidence than the crown.

But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power to check the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills. It again supposes that the king is wiser than those whom it has already supposed to be wiser than him. A mere absurdity!

There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of monarchy. It first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is required. The state of a king shuts him from the world, yet the business of a king requires him to know it thoroughly. Wherefore, the different parts, by unnaturally opposing and destroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.

Some writers have explained the English constitution thus: the king, say they, is one and the people another. The peers are a house in behalf of the king and the commons in behalf of the people. But this has all the distinctions of a house divided against itself. And, though the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when examined they appear idle and ambiguous. 

It will always happen that the nicest construction that words are capable of, when applied to the description of something which either cannot exist or is too incomprehensible to be within the compass of description, will be words of sound only. Though they may amuse the ear, they cannot inform the mind, for this explanation includes a previous question, viz. 

How came the king by a power which the people are afraid to trust, and always obliged to check? Such a power could not be the gift of a wise people. Neither can any power, which needs checking, be from God. Yet, the provision, which the constitution makes, supposes such a power to exist.

But the provision is unequal to the task. The means either cannot or will not accomplish the end, and the whole affair is a felo de se. 

For as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as all the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one. It only remains to know which power in the constitution has the most weight, for that will govern; and though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or, as the phrase is, check the rapidity of its motion. 

Yet, so long as they cannot stop it, their endeavors will be ineffectual; the first moving power will at last have its way, and what it wants in speed is supplied by time.

That the crown is this overbearing part in the English constitution needs not be mentioned, and that it derives its whole consequence merely from being the giver of places and pensions is self-evident. Wherefore, though we have been wise enough to shut and lock a door against absolute monarchy, we at the same time have been foolish enough to put the crown in possession of the key.

The prejudice of Englishmen — in favor of their own government by king, lords, and commons — arises as much or more from national pride than reason. Individuals are undoubtedly safer in England than in some other countries, but the will of the king is as much the law of the land in Britain as in France. With this difference, that, instead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the people under the more formidable shape of an act of parliament. For the fate of Charles the First, has only made kings more subtle — not more just.

Wherefore, laying aside all national pride and prejudice in favor of modes and forms, the plain truth is — that it is wholly owing to the constitution of the people, and not to the constitution of the government, that the crown is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey.

An inquiry into the constitutional errors in the English form of government is at this time highly necessary. For as we are never in a proper condition of doing justice to others, while we continue under the influence of some leading partiality. So, neither are we capable of doing it to ourselves while we remain fettered by any obstinate prejudice. 

And as a man, who is attached to a prostitute, is unfitted to choose or judge of a wife. So, any prepossession in favor of a rotten constitution of government will disable us from discerning a good one.