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Reincarnation: A Study of the Human Soul

By J.A. Anderson

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The Physiological Evidence Of The existence Of The

A STUDY of the Soul, or of those phenomena of con- X\. sciousness usually classed under this head, must logically be prefaced by proof that a "soul" really exists. Some doubt arises as to whether this can be best accomplished by an examination of those general evolutionary processes which lead up to the human soul as a necessary sequence, or whether the phenomena of human consciousness itself shall be first considered. As appeal will be
taken to both classes of phenomena, it has been thought best to begin with the latter method, leaving the broader and more philosophic generalizations of evolution to follow. The evidence of a soul, then, will be sought the human body is a mechanism constructed and controlled from within, without, by a central energy called variously "mind," "soul," "spirit," or "Ego," according to the inclination or bias of the writer. The existence of this central energy is disputed by no one; the issue being as to the relation it sustains to the body. Broadly defined, Materialism declares the mind or soul to be the product of the molecular activities going on within the brain ; or, if not a direct product, at least a concomitant of these. Under this view, it must necessarily cease to exist when the brain molecules cease their activities. To account for the appearance of a conscious factor as an outcome of purely mechanical motion among molecules, it declares this to be a "property" of matter, capable of being exhibited under certain conditions similarly as electricity may
be made to manifest its presence under proper excitation. Spiritualism takes directly the opposite view. It declares that, while it is true that molecular activities are the counterparts of conscious experience, upon this plane, the rela- tion of effect is entirely upon the material side ; that the mind or soul is causal, and quite superior to and independent of the body, except as this is a mechanism of sense organs constructed and synthesized by it, in order to re- late its higher consciousness to material planes. There can thus be no compromise; one or the other theory errs. A little examination makes it evident that all thought, emotion, willing or feeling arise from and in the inner re- cesses of our being, and are then reflected outwards in speech or action, or remain as unexpressed, subjective ideas or feelings. It is quite true that this inner arousing is apparently due primarily to external stimuli alone, and that all through life external impressions transmuted into sensations form a much larger basis for even the highest intellectual life than would be suspected except upon a searching analysis. But ex nihilo nihil fit; and if there were not present in the body a potential center of conciousness capable of being aroused, external stimuli might knock for eternal ages at the door of life without awakening a conscious response.

Here, at the first step, then, the battle for the existence of the soul begins. For when physiologists or psychologists say, though ever so glibly and confidently, that an external stimulus has been converted through nervous "shock" into a "sense" impression, they are assuming to explain a process of which they have absolutely no knowledge, and which no microscope nor culture chamber has ever demonstrated, nor can ever hope to demonstrate.

For, "if by nervous shock be meant a psychical event, the break between such shock and the nerve commotion which is its antecedent is absolutely impassible. No physical energy, under the general laws of its conservation and correlation, can pass this break."* Nor no lightly leaping across a chasm proves its non-existence. In sound, for example, an entirely mechanical and physical shock has been transmuted into terms of consciousness utterly unlike its cause. Until it can be shown both how and why mechanical motion becomes sensation, two factors must be as- sumed. These are the receiver and transmitter of the nervous shock or commotion, and the inner observer of this commotion, as it records itself in molecular agitation
or changes within the brain.

It will be cheerfully admitted that this inner observer is quite dependent upon the physical apparatus for sensation upon and communication with the material plane, but this dependence in no way argues its non-existence as an entity, or the non-possibility of its possessing much higher powers upon its own spiritual plane than its sense organs enable it to display upon this. As has been beautifully pointed out by Prof. Ladd : "Beings do not lose their reality, or characteristic nature, or value in the universe of Being, because they are causally connected with other beings. On the contary, none but real beings can thus be con- nected with each other; none but real beings can act and be acted upon. The so-called causal connection is no bondage of such nature as to destroy the nature of the beings which act under it. Only beings that have natures of their own can be causally connected. In other words, all that appears to us as a causal relation between the objects of our experience is, ultimately considered, due to no material spur or whip which urges, or band that represses, as though one kind of real being could thus dominate and subdue another. No atom acts without being acted on ; what it does depends both upon what it is and also upon how it stands related to other atoms."* The break between physical motion and conscious sensation, if there really be one, is between the sentient atom and the physical molecule. And Prof. Ladd is therefore quite correct in insisting that: "No relation exists between these two kinds of beings [soul and body] which can be represented as an interchange of physical energy, under the law of the conservation and correlation of such energy. This fact, however, affords no objection to our recognizing a true causal connection between the two, unless we are ready to insist upon the monstrous claim that modern physical science is entitled to affirm the impossibility of any interaction (or conditional action) taking place in the universe otherwise than between material atoms under the aforesaid law. Yet the soul is not utterly unrelated to the body by the actual transmission of energy; for were this the case a physical response to the will would be impossible. There is a transmission of energy from the soul to the body, actual and real, but it does not consist in the ebbing and flowing of physical force The soul may be said to use modes of the "inter-etheric force" of Keeley, for its material base is composed necessarily of these inner and more potent states of matter. These forces the soul lib- erates in willing, which latter results in motion upon its own plane ; and this, while not interchanging, is the cause of a corresponding molecular motion on the plane below. It is thus true that each cycle of energy is unrelated in the way of the conservation or correlation of the energy of one
plane upon that of the other; for each completes its cycle in its own proper field of action, and no mode of force belonging to one plane passes over from that to another.

But each can none the less act upon the other; and, in the case of the soul, the terrible inter-etheric nature of the energy used may be seen in instances of the sudden death of the body from fright, anger or strong emotion. Physical force and soul, or will-force, touch each other's boundaries, but the very rebound keeps each acting in its own proper domain. Yet this touch is actual, and sets up motion on the other plane; though, as correctly
pointed out by Prof. Ladd, nothing physical passes from the one to the other. Nor does anything physical pass when one moving billiard ball strikes another, yet the lat- ter is none the less set in motion. In the same manner there is no plane of the manifested cosmos utterly unrelated to others. Effects may pass though causes do not.The human nervous system is plainly a mechanism to relate entities thus acting upon different planes and using dissimilar modes of force. It has its end-organs to receive impacts from without, or those from the material world; its system of nerve-wires to conduct not the shocks, but certain effects of these entirely unlike them in essence to the brain and minor ganglia; and, lastly, these ganglionic collections of gray matter, to receive and to send out counter-shocks or commotions to other appropriate endorgans, which cause motion in response to such stimuli. Yet in this, which seems so entirely mechanical, there has entered a factor which has hopelessly removed it from the domain of material physics, and which demonstrates that by means of the highly complex nervous organism the body has been related to the plane of spirit, or consciousness. Motion has been translated into terms of sensation, a thing unthinkable except as the act of a conscious entity. Motion can not become sensation; it can only be rec- ognized as motion by a conscious entity, and conscious inferences or information deduced therefrom. A billiard ball may be made to strike another, and this still another ; but no synthesizing power arises out of the original impact or resulting motion. Nor could such power arise though force enough were used to keep the whole set caroming among each other for ages. Logic and reason absolutely require the presence of the conscious factor to take note of the molecular commotion caused by the physical impact, and to originate upon its part n,ew and appropriate molecular agitations in response, in the manner indicated.

There must be, then, a conscious entity moving both billiard balls and brain molecules, else neither could ever synthesize themselves into orderly sequences. That there are certain complex reflex responses continually taking place, which are even absolutely necessary to our existence,
without rising to the plane of our brain or mind consciousness, does not weaken, but rather strengthens, the argument for such an entity. For the greater the complexity of the mechanism, the greater the necessity for an intelli- gent, synthesizing center of consciousness to control this complexity. And, as evolution shows, these minor centers of activity are lower entities, in a universe which is but embodied consciousness of some degree, working their way upward in the scale of becoming, and aided very materially by this association with a superior directing and
controlling energy.

The psychical experiences arising from physical energy acting upon the periphery of the body are too unlike that energy to be related directly thereto. There are many physiological processes necessary before the energy rises above the threshold of consciousness as a psychical experience. What these are physiology can not explain, and psychology is equally helpless. At the physical side they may be first simply dynamic, and then complex or chemical; at the psychic threshold, they must be the perceptions of a conscious, cognizing entity. In man alone this entity is self-conscious, but an entity of some degree is none the less present in every form of organic life as its synthesizer and organizer. That even in man the relation between this inner cognizer and the form through which it acts is intimate and mutually dependent, goes without saying. The immediate agent in this intimacy is undoubtedly the mechanism of the nervous system, the duty of which is to concatenate or synthesize the sense impressions arising out of the innumerable physical impacts uponthe periphery of them body. But a mechanism requires a mechanic, and this is plainly the inner soul. There can be no equality between a mere mechanism, as such, and the intelligence which directs it. In the case of man, too, the mechanism does not express the entire powers of its inner mover, which of itself quite disproves the materialistic theory, however much we might otherwise be inclined to accept it. There is positively no physical equivalent possible for any of the higher faculties. What particular motion among the molecules of the brain can .be postulated
as the physical equivalent and causal antecedent of our conceptions of justice, of truth, of moral obligation? Thefeeblest mind revolts against such a crass conception of its native powers. Perception and sensation may be con- ceived of as arising out of physical correlates, but no such correlate can be conceived of the being who moves about, as it were, among these, selecting this one and rejecting that. The physical brain is limited to motion only; it can not choose its own mode of motion even. Of these powers, which even the wildest materialism can not connect with any physical process, the unity of consciousness is perhaps the most convincing proof of the existence of a soul. Unity is unique in consciousness; it is undefinable, unapproachable ; yet none the less it IS; and every act, thought, emotion, willing or feeling is, consciously or unconsciously, built upon and referred to this underlying unit, the "I am I." All the myriad states of consciousness are recognized by this ''I" as its own. Thestates, indeed, may result from  external causes in nature, or internal, within the organism; but the "I," the unit of consciousness, the synthesizer of them all, has no such rela- tion. It is, in truth, a reflection of that incomprehensible

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE. 

Unity which is One and yet All, at the dawn of a manvantara. No number of successive states of consciousness can constitute the unity which synthesizes and connects them all. The string of pearls must have a real string, or they are but individual gems, not a sequence of them. Nor can any conceivable number of molecules constitute unity, for upon their own plane each is a unit, and no mere combination of them can produce self-conscious unity upon a higher. They can be synthesized by unity from above into a complex system upon their own plane, but even in this relation they are units grouped, not unity.

Again, the mind is a unit, or it could not perceive it- self at all. If it were composed of a complexity of varying states it would exist only as such variety, and no one state would have any real hold upon or memory of those past, or anticipation of those to come. We can not conceive, much less perceive, any quality in nature which we do not possess. It would be so foreign, so utterly unrelated to our consciousness that we might owe our very being to it without being aware of its existence. Unity can alone recognize unity can alone construct unit things out of the objects in nature. We recognize such unit beings or "things" in nature ; we could not bestow this quality upon them did we not possess it, nor could we recognize it at the base of our "I am I" if it were not really there. As has been so forcibly pointed out by Lotze:

"No twisting of imagination, or subtlety of argument, can show how a mind not really one could appear to itself at all; or break the
strength of the conviction inwrought into the very structure of self- consciousness, that the real and spiritual being, which we call Mind, is not a fortunate confluence or phenomenal center of changing modes, but a unit-being, and a reason of all unity in whatever be- comes the object of its thought."Nor does this recognition of a real unit, an "I am myself," ever vary, from the cradle to the grave. Throughpain and grief, in joy or gladness, in youth or age, thoughmeans after means of communication with externals becut off by disease or old age, through every conceivable mental change of opinion or belief, the "I am I" is equally undisturbed. The connection between soul and bodymust be absolutely severed by insanity (disease) or death
for this center of consciousness to cease to recognize itself upon this plane, even as a real, abiding unity. Everystate of consciousness is constantly referred to this "I" as its base, as the subject which experiences the state. Amental self-conscious state not involving an "I" at its base is absolutely unthinkable. In this "I," thus shown to be necessary to self-conscious existence, there are many other attributes, besides those wehave been studying, incapable of arising out of any combination of sense-perceptions, and which must therefore be inherent to or potential within itself. One such is memory. This is a reproduction in consciousness, not only of things not there, but of things which never were there. For the things we perceive through our senses are not stored up in the brain even as infinitesimally small pict- ures or representations, for they never reach our brain as such. It is only the effects of these, recorded in molecular changes, which are thus stored, and the mind in re- membering has to take these old effects, connect them with
their old causes, and from this construct the old representation. Truly, this is a creative process, requiring a creative center of consciousness, and a center which can only exercise this power through its being one in essence with creative consciousness in nature. It requires an abiding, permanent "I," or the picture could not be recognized as belonging to a past experience. As has been pointed out by Prof. Ladd : "It is a fact of consciousness, on which all possibility of connected experience and of recorded and cumulative human knowledge is de- pendent, that certain phases or products of consciousness appear with a claim to stand for [to represent] past experiences to which they are regarded as in some respect similar. It is this peculiar claim in consciousness which constitutes the essence of an act of memory; it is this which makes memory wholly inexplicable as a mere persist- ence or recurrence of similar impressions. It is this which makes conscious memory a spiritual phenomenon, the explanation of which , as arising out of nervous processes and conditions, is not simply undiscoverable in fact, but utterly incapable of approach by imagination. When, then, we speak of a physical basis of memory, recognition must be made of the complete inability of science to suggest any physical process which can be conceived of as correlated with that peculiar and mysterious actus of the mind, connecting its present and its past, which constitutes the essence of memory."*

Again, memory proves a unit center because each soul remembers its own experiences only. It cannot encroach upon those of another, which would be the case if there were any general remembrance possible in nature. No chasm can be more abrupt or impassible than the line which divides conscious experiences; and no theory will account for this except that of permanent, conscious unit- centers or souls. It is granted that impressions are registered not only in the brain, but in every tissue of the body as well, for each organ has its memory, but "For that spiritual activity which actually puts together in consciousness the sensations, there can not even be suggested the be- ginning of a physical explanation."

This-is to be found in a unifying center, or soul, alone. Memory, then, is a conscious reproduction by a permanent center of consciousness, an "I am myself," of past experiences. Especially will this be apparent when the relation of will to memory is considered. We consciously and deliberately will to reproduce past events an impossible process were there not within us the subject of those experiences we will to recall. In the Will, also, we find a power native to the soul, and one unthinkable except as the action of a conscious entity. As well predicate thought without a Thinker as will without a Willing Entity. This faculty is entirely without a physical basis, or at least it has no physical or- gans, but pervades the entire structure of the body, apparently as the agent of an inner, controlling essence. Nor is an organ necessary; for the simple, homogeneous speck of protoplasm known as the amoeba, structureless and entirely destitute of organs, exercises this faculty un- deniably in those changes it makes "which can not be
wholly explained by reference to any change in its environments." Its superiority to and control over the body as a purely physical mechanism is shown by the fact, pointed out by Duchenne, and others, that the will is the very first agent to act upon restored nerve fibers after their injury. It is the active agent of consciousness in selecting what sensations and perceptions, among the vast number continuously clamoring for the soul's attention, shall be at- tended to. It can even change the very reports, so to speak, of those sense organs, upon whose action materialism would fain have us base its coming into existence.

Willing, too, is a purely mental activity. No passing-over of force from spiritual to physical realms accompanies its action. There is positively no physical energy expended in willing. All the apparent effort is entirely the result of the physical mechanism carrying out, or attempting to carry out, the mandates of the will, as pronounced by the Ego.
Like the memory, too, the will is always specialized.

There is no general willing; it can only act with a definite object. Its sole material connection is that when a fiat of the will issues certain molecules, associated with the line of action willed, move. But this shows an extraneous mover. It is a physical correlation of molecules with an act of consciousness; not an origination in such motion of either will or consciousness. Were there no other evi- dence, the undoubtedly genuine cases of recovery from deep-seated diseases under the action of the will would be sufficient to show that it is either the agent of th$ mind, or the mind itself, in activity, and quite superior to the physical body which it controls. It is true that, primarily, acts of the will arise out of sensations and perceptions depending upon environment; but the choosing among these of the particular perception or sensation to which the attention shall be directed is a new element, which can not be relegated to mere experiences, or a combination of any other mental activities. It is a deliberate
choice of a tool by an artisan having more than one at his disposal.

For if we examine these very sensations themselves, which materialism claims have arisen out of mechanical motion among physical molecules, we find that they are located in the mind itself, and not in the body. They evade all attempts to reduce them to the domain of physics by measurement. There is no standard in all molecular physics to determine the amount of sensation involved in a "severe" pain or a "highly pleasurable" feel- ing. Being activities of the mind alone, and only correlated with, not transmuted from, molecular activities, they can only be expressed in terms of consciousness, not in those of physics.

We have several sense organs, also, each carrying a distinct class of impressions to the mind. To synthesize these widely varying activities into a harmonious whole, recognized by the "I am I" as its experiences, requires that this "I am I" should be separate from and superior to any one or all of them. And upon this ability to as- sociate different classes of sensations is built the mind's power to project and locate in space those objects whichits sense-organs bring into its environment. The sensations themselves can not be extended within the brain ; it requires a power potent in the soul itself to project into space certain sensations depending, as has beenpointed out, upon molecular activities entirely unlike themin action and essence. The presence of this synthesizing center is shown unquestionably by the fact that a synthesis does take place that two or more distinct sensations are unified in the mind as one object. Were there not this synthesizing center, different senses, such as sight, hearing and touch, might all report the same object; but how could any knowledge arise that all these reports re- ferred to the same thing without a synthesizer? Except for synthesis, also, there could be but one sensation at a time actively present in a consciousness compounded only of varying states. And were there but one sense organ,
which would be practically the case if but one could act at once, our concepts of time and space would be so changedthat we would be as unlike our present selves as an oys-ter, whose consciousness, indeed, must be largely similar to that which ours would be under such circumstances.

Sensations and ideas are themselves only phenomena, and not entities. It is impossible, therefore, for a sensation to be the subject of its own states; there is absolutely required an entity for this purpose. Nor can any reason be given why motion should become sensation. It is not a product of evolution As pointed out by Prof. Ladd:

' 'That I am affected with a certain sensation of color, lying at the bottom of the spectrum's scale, when several billion vibrations of ether strike the retina, and with a qualitatively different sensation when the number of vibrations is increased by several billions more, cannot be explained as an evolution. The same remark holds within the limits of each of the other senses. Their scales of quality are not such that experiences at one place of the scale can be evolved from those at other places of the scale. Some of them, such as smell and taste, do not admit of being referred to any form of a scale dia- gram representing relations of quality. The feeling of heat is not another phase of the feeling of cold; neither of the feelings of temperature is to be explained as arising out of feelings of pressure or motion."*

It is quite evident, too, that the senses restrain and limit the powers of the Ego. As observed by Plato, "The soul reasons best when least harassed by the senses." There are evidently more "things" than senses, as is shown in many ways; notably, in the world of effects lying just outside the colors of the spectrum, and of which our senses afford us no intimation. Finally, if the sense organs were the result of outer stimuli there could never happen, as is the case with every organized being now, the construction of sense organs in entire absence of the stimuli held to be a necessary antecedent to their appearance. Every child at birth comes into the world with perfectly formed eyes which have never known the stimulus of light, and so on, although in a lesser degree, with all its sense organs. It is no explanation to say that these have been primarily so organized, and are now transmitted by heredity; for the very first step in their acquirement, no matter how small, has always and necessarily been taken in the silence anddarkness of subjective being. The outer stimuli have only aroused the inner response; they have not created, nor can they create, evolve, nor even modify, this. Of course, we shall be met here with the materialistic assertion that, as the vegetable kingdom, even, showstraces of nerve functions, and as this proceeds upwardthrough the apparently structureless amoeba to the highly complex system of rnan, increasing in conscious functioning with each increase of specialization, sensation is thus plainly a product of evolution. Yet the functions of the simplest nervous system are unique. Nothing in the whole curriculum of physical science affords even a working hypothesis by which to explain or account for the appearance of the conscious factor. Until some reasonable attempt is made to explain how motion becomes sensation, occult theories must take precedence; especially as these are in full accord with the facts. These teach that the outer sense organ is constructed by and because of the inner impulse of consciousness seeking expression in form, in order to bring about sense relations on the material plane the only relation possible at the present stage of the soul's becoming; and that so far from consciousness arising mechanically out of these sense organs, they actually limit and inhibit conscious manifestations. There is a continuous effort for more consciousness to function than the sense organ affords opportunity for, which fact is the very base and causal antecedent of all so-called evolution, were science not too blind to perceive it. But he who starts in the wrong direction travels a weary journey; and until scientists cease to seek in material phenomena for the origin of consciousness they can only increase their distance from the truth by any apparent progress they may make.

To return: Of ideas arising out of sensations it can only be affirmed that they are modes of activity of the Ego, not of any conceivable physical juxtaposition of molecules. The laws governing the association of ideas are to be found in the nature of the soul itself. They can not be derived from any known behavior of so-called physical atoms. They are sui generis; and, while undoubtedly correlated with, do not nor can not arise out of, the molecular activities of the brain because of the impassible gulf shown to exist between motion and sensation. Their origination is inexplicable unless we admit the presence of an observing entity, or soul. Ideas can not associate themselves; and while they may arise semi-mechanically in an idle brain, the case is quite different when the aroused Ego, through its will, asserts not only what ideas shall arise in the mind, but the manner of their association as well. All material ideas having their root in sensations are conscious relations of the Ego to the material plane, conditioned upon its material organ.

They are in no way similar to the Ego's consciousness of self, or of its own being. The mind or thinking Ego never applies the terms of sensation arising out of its relations with external nature to its own being; it never thinks of itself as "large" or "small," or as "hot" or "cold."

Nothing could be more definite than the line drawn between its own native and proper functions and those arising out of its as- sociation with the sense organs of the body. And so entirely dependent is sensation upon the soul that clear vision and acute hearing, etc., depend for their nicety not upon perfect sense organs though these are necessaryaccessories, but upon a clear mental interpretation ofwhat is seen or heard.

Again, if consciousness were a transmutation, in someinconceivable manner, of molecular into psychic activities within the brain, then there ought to be both a specialization of nerve substance and a constant ratio between the brain and mind. But, as Prof. Ladd states:
' 'So far as we know anything about the particular molecular activities of the central nervous system which are most directly connected with the phenomena of consciousness, they do not differ essentially from other molecular activities of this system not thus connected with consciousness. The chemical constitution and structural form of the nerve-fibers and nerve-cells of the brain do not differ from those of the spinal cord in any such respect as, of itself, to account for the difference in the relations in which the two stand to conscious mental states. They do not so differ even from the molecules which enter into the living plant or animal, of much lower species, mentally, than man."*

Thus there is evidently no physical evolution of the ganglionic cells after they have reached a certain point. The most profound philosopher is using cells of the samekind to relate him to sensuous existence as his Darwinian"cousin," the ape. There ought to have been a further and most marked specialization of form and structure if mental activities had been evolved from increasing nerv-ous complexities. Instead of this, there is only an entirely relative not absolute increase in the amount of these cells. Is it not evident that "gray matter" is only the pigment, as it were, with which the ape makes his feeble conscious daubs, while man produces magnificent paintings because the pigment in his case is in the hands of superior intelligence ? There is often, too, the most marked divergence between mental and physical evolution. The human child comes into the world perfectly mindless as far as anything beyond reflex action is concerned, yet it is possessed of a most perfect and elaborate nervous system, ufar surpassing
that of the most intelligent adult animal." Where is the mental activity which ought to have unavoidably accompanied this physical evolution, if the one process arises out of the other? In the first year of the child's life, mental activity makes the most wonderful strides, running far ahead of its supposed physical source. The same in- equality attends their relations throughout life. Especially is it marked in old age, where, long after the physical
has ceased to progress, and is even rapidly retrogressing, the mind retains all its pristine vigor. Of course, this is seen only in cases of men who have lived a mental life. A man who has passed his existence as an ambulating vegetable decays like one; he has no mind to shine forth amidst the ruins of his body. But the presence of a vigor- ous mentality connected with great physical decrepitude in but one case proves its possibility in all. Cases of illness with mental vigor are in point here in fact, many dis- eases, by refining and subduing animality, actually in- crease mentality. Of course, there is a golden mean, and bodily age or disease to the point of cutting off the Ego's hold upon its sense organs must be followed by their ceas- ing to give evidence of its presence. In such cases mental decrepitude apparently follows upon the physical.

But, as already pointed out, there can be no argument drawn from this intimate dependence upon the body by the soul for its conscious relations with this plane against its actual and independent existence. Every entity in nature is dependent upon other entities; the very cells of man's body are made up of countless lives, having their own life history beyond and outside of this association, upon which, nevertheless, they entirely depend. The Egowithin the body shows more numerous and important phenomena to entitle it to be claimed as a real unit entity than do any or all physical phenomena on the part of the latter; and if either is to be declared non-existent, it must, by all the laws of logic, be the body, and not the soul. But the crowning physiological argument in favor of a soul is in the nature of consciousness itself, and that, as has been pointed out, all its higher spiritual activities can neither be connected with any definite material organ nor proven to arise out of any conceivable mode of molecular motion within the brain.

"For all the higher spiritual faculties," says Lotze, "which consist in judgment of the relations of given conceptions, we neither know how empirically to demonstrate a definite bodily organ, nor should we know how to conceive precisely what such an organ could contribute toward the solution of the most essential part of the problem that is, the pronouncing of the judgment itself. It is conceivable, on the other hand, that these higher activities might presuppose the complete and clear representation of the content about which the judgment is to be passed, and, consequently, also the undisturbed
function of those organs which contribute, first, to perception by the senses; then to its reproduction and combination with other percep-tions; and, finally, to the appropriate attachment of feelings of value to each" of them."*

Yet this " clear representation of the content about which the judgment is to be passed" must not be conceived of as taking part in the judgment itself. This would land us in the materialistic absurdity of supposing that all the activities of consciousness were only the product of the molecular associations concerned in their representation. As well try to identify the bile as a real physical secretion of hypochondria, or tears as liquid sor- row. In this connection, too much stress can not be laid upon the importance of the unity of consciousness (before re- ferred to), of the Ego, or soul. All our mental faculties are but modes of its behavior. Its presence and native powers are demonstrated by its phenomenal activities. It would be less unphilosophic to deny the existence of electricity than of the center of consciousness at the base of the soul; for all we know concerning the former is drawn entirely from its objective phenomena, while of the latter we have in addition to these its subjective phenomena as well. And although the mental states, perceptions and sensations may be and are innumerable, they are alike re- ferred to the one subject the "I" upon which they all rest. Is it a thinkable proposition that the whole possible gamut of conscious experiences could be thus unified in a subject of them all without the real and actual existence of that subject ? "To have a variety of changing states attributed to it as the subject of them all this is to demonstrate in consciousness a claim to real being. Unchanging rigidity, the permanence of the mathematical point or of the material atom, on the supposition that the latter undergoes no interior changes whatever, if such rigidity and permanence anywhere exist, constitutes no claim to the title of real being.

' ' The soul exists in reality, above all other kinds of being, because it alone, so far as we know on good evidence, knows itself as the subject of its own states; or, indeed, knows the states of which it is the subject as states belonging to itself. But its law is that of development; and, unlike all 'things' which are subjects of various kinds of evolution, so called, the soul can recognize the law of its own being.

When, therefore, we are asked what the mind really is, we can re- spond by telling what it comes to be as the result of its unfolding under the fixed conditions of its native powers. But these 'powers' cannot be called native, as though they were actual achievements of the mind's inborn faculties, or separate forms of energy inherent in it, after the analogy of the forces said [somewhat unintelligibly, it must be admitted,] to be 'inherent' in the atom. "But we do not define the nature of any real being simply by stat- ing how it appears and behaves in its most germinal and undeveloped form. The tree explains the seed; the adult bird, the egg; the character of the highly differentiated product must be studied in order to know the full description of the energies that are potential in the simple stages. It is an undoubted fact that the mind [soul] has a history in each individual case; and in each case such history is a development. This self-recognizing unity of development which belongs to the mind is a striking proof of the validity of its claim to be considered a real being. As the being .which acts and knows it- self as acting, which is acted upon and knows itself affected, which is the subject of states and itself attributes these states to itself, which develops according to a plan and so remembers and compre- hends the significance of the past states that it can recognize the fact of its own development as such a being the mind [soul] is more entitled to consider itself 'real' than to consider real any of the various objects that, immediately or indirectly, appear before it in the course There is still another faculty of the mind which is, if possible, even more undiscoverable in and unrelated to any definite physical basis than those heretofore considered. This is that aspect or phase of consciousness known as the Feelings. Just what feeling consists in escapes definition. It is an innate, underived power of consciousness. It accompanies all sensation and all ideation, while it itself may be and often is experienced independently of any other conscious state. It is therefore, upon this plane at least, a basic aspect evidently of consciousness, if not the very essence of this itself. For all sense of personal identity may be lost, as in chloroform narcosis; all thought may cease, as in yoga or other concentration; all will may be suspended, as in the passivity of mediumship; or these may be annulled or suspended together in moments of terror, surprise, joy, or pleasure.

Yet, untouched by all, burns the steady light of a conscious center which feels that it exists, or, rather, that it IS. That feeling is related to this plane by the sense organs is evident. That it is modified as to its states by these, follows as a necessary corollary, else there would be no reason for or even possibility of the association; but that it arises, de novo, out of any possible combination of merely fortuitous molecular activities is simply absurd.

It measures all sensation, as to whether it is painful, pleasurable, or neutral (if such a state can exist); it equally accompanies thought, and classifies this by its own inherent analytical powers as belonging to or connected with one or other of the higher activities of the mind, such as imaginative, religious, moral, esthetical, etc. It binds all the other faculties of the mind into an unity such as is unexplainable except as the conscious functioning of a self-conscious Ego. Feeling accompanies all possible experience. Whether one hate or love, whether he live in intellectual realms or those of sensuous emotions, feeling accompanies each state so faithfully that the only explanation of this is that it is the presence of a self-conscious soul, exercising an underived and underivable power in- nate in consciousness itself, and hence a ray from or an aspect of the Causeless Cause, in its finite manifestation.

All the evidence thus adduced to prove the presence of a soul as a necessary deduction from physiological phe- nomena must not be understood as asserting or even in- dicating that this soul is capable of being analyzed and its nature explained, because we can prove its existence.

There is no phenomenon, nor entity, nor being in the universe which does not at last escape analysis by disappearing in the great Unknowable Source of All, the Causeless Cause. But it would seem the height of unphilosophic reasoning to admit the reality of the fleeting and illusionary beings which constitute our bodies, to- gether with their environments, and then to deny the real existence of the conscious and permanent base, the Knower, Observer and Recorder of this illusory experience. An Unknowable must always be admitted as an ultimate factor; the finite can never hope to contain or measure the Infinite, but we must beware that in our ignorance we do not relegate to this Unknowable problems which belong only to the Unknown, and which it is vital to our progress, and even our very existence, that we discover. To this Unknown which must be discovered belong evidently inquiries such as we have been considering, as well as all phenomena which relate to the existence of the soul, the modes of its behavior, the things which re- tard, prevent or accelerate its progress through the Cycle of Necessity in which it has its present being. first in Human Physiology.

Without cumbering the argument with histological, anatomical, or even physiological details, to be found in the numerous text-books upon these subjects, let it suffice to state generally that these and allied sciences prove that